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1. Introduction 
Nuclear weapon has created brought 
major influence in international politics. It 
shapes the interaction between states. Thus, 
Andrew Krepinevich (1994) argued that 
nuclear had brought a revolution to the use of 
warfare, especially after the assembling of 
nuclear warheads with ballistic missiles. This 
nuclear revolution provided the opportunity for 
instant and complete destruction of its target. 
Furthermore, it becomes a political fabric for 
strategic equation.
1
 
Moreover, Bernard Brodie (1946)
 
described nuclear weapon as the absolute 
weapon.
2
 It is because nuclear weapon is able 
to result in a catastrophic damage. The drop of 
the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
near the end of World War II demonstrated the 
power of nuclear weapon.  To contain such 
fears, the nuclear nonproliferation regime was 
established. However, the regime is not able to 
influence all of the states in the world to 
disarm their nuclear weapons.
 
1
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in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A.Maiolo, 
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2
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Abstract : This paper try to explain why a country refused to join the nuclear weapons 
nonproliferation regime. The main argument of this article is the failure of the nuclear weapons 
nonproliferation regime to create a state-nuclear  negara abandon their nuclear weapons because 
the regime does not successfully complete the core problem that triggered the decision to develop 
nuclear weapons. The decision will be difficult to change when it is done in order to maintain 
domestic power in the country that has nuclear weapons. Moreover, the perception of threat also 
came from rival states with nuclear weapons or non-nuclear states in alliance with the nuclear 
state. This article uses a case study of North Korea to prove the argument the author. 
 
Abstrak: Tulisan ini mencoba menjelaskan mengapa sebuah negara menolak untuk bergabung 
dengan rezim nonproliferasi senjata nuklir. Argumen utama dari artikel ini adalah kegagalan rezim 
nonproliferasi senjata nuklir untuk membuat negara -negara nuklir meninggalkan senjata nuklir 
mereka karena rezim tersebut tidak berhasil menyelesaikan inti permasalahan yang menjadi 
pemicu keputusan untuk mengembangkan senjata nuklir. Keputusan tersebut akan sulit untuk 
berubah ketika hal tersebut dilakukan demi mempertahankan kekuasaan domestik di dalam negara 
yang memiliki senjata nuklir. Terlebih persepsi ancaman yang juga datang dari negara rival yang 
memiliki senjata nuklir atau  negara non-nuklir yang beraliansi dengan negara nuklir. Artikel ini 
menggunakan studi kasus Korea Utara untuk membuktikan argumen penulis.  
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Why are some states unwilling to join 
the nuclear nonproliferation regimes? In fact, 
these nuclear nonproliferation regimes offer 
various incentives if states are willing to join 
Keywords : nuclear weapon, nuclear nonproliferation regime, nuclear politics, North Korea, Juche 
the regimes. Nevertheless, some states choose 
to join the nuclear nonproliferation regimes. 
Why are these states willing to join, while the 
others refuse it? If we consider states as 
rational actors, it will be logical to conclude 
that the incentives failed to attract these 
countries. In the sense of “stick” and “carrot”, 
the right “ carrot” for the states which refuse 
nuclear nonproliferation regime is debatable. 
This question is central to explain the behavior 
of new nuclear states, such as India, Pakistan 
and North Korea. 
The hypothesis for this paper is that 
states maintain their nuclear weapon because it 
is an instrument to ensure their security. 
Further, nuclear weapon ensures (or at least 
stimulate) the support from its people to the 
government since the weapon boost prestige to 
the owner. For this paper, I will use North 
Korea as a case study.
 
This paper will start by evaluating the 
nuclear non proliferation regime. The hypothesis
is  then   assessed   against  the case  of  North 
Korea. Then, the  paper will  conclude  with
the implication of the findings on policy making-
in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  
 
2. Nuclear Weapon and International Regime
 
2.1. Why Nuclear Weapon?  
According to the realist, military 
power is the instrument to achieve the 
objective in the international politics.  Further, 
states will acquire and change the quantity and 
quality of the armed forces they already have. 
This condition is described by Barry Buzan 
(1987) as arms dynamics.  He also presented 
three models to explain the arms dynamics.  
First, the action reaction model explains that 
the driving force of the arms dynamics is the 
competitive relations between states. Second, 
the domestic structure model is the driving 
force of arms dynamics comprising the internal 
economic, organizational and political working 
of states. Third, technological imperative 
refers to the arms dynamics that is driven by 
the improvement of technology.
3
 
Meanwhile, Robert Art (1980) defined 
the four functions of military force: defense, 
deterrence, compellence and “ swaggering. “ 
The defensive use of force refers to the 
deployment of military power to parry an 
attack and minimize damage to oneself if 
attacked. The deterrent use of force is the 
deployment of military power in order to 
prevent an adversary from undesired action 
which he might be tempted to do. This is 
achieved by threatening him with unacceptable 
punishment if he does it. Next, the term 
compellent explains the use of military power 
so as to be able to either stop an adversary 
from doing something that he has already 
undertaken or get him to do something he has 
not yet undertaken. The last function, 
swaggering refers to the use of military force 
for enhancing the national pride of a people or 
3
 Barry Buzan, 1987, An Introduction to Strategic 
Studies: Military Technology and International 
Relations, New York: St. Martin‘s Press,  pp 73-
74 
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satisfy the personal ambitions of its ruler. The 
ruler swaggers in order to enhance the nation’s 
image, and bargaining power in the councils of 
international decision-making.
4
 Further, Robert 
Art also noted, for great powers, nuclear 
weapons have much swagger appeal.
5
 Thus, 
nuclear weapon states believe nuclear forces 
4
Robert J. Art, 1980, “To What Ends Military 
Power?”, International Security, Vol.4 No.4,  pp 
5-11 
can leverage their security by maintaining an 
ability to counter particular threats; to obtain 
5
 Ibid p.17 
certain policy goals; display national power; 
preserve freedom of action; or as a protection 
against uncertainty and risks in a changing 
international environment.
6
 
Robert Art‘s argument also supported 
by Muthiah Alagappa (2008), who explained 
that the primary function of nuclear weapon is 
to ensure survival and preserve the status quo 
by deterring aggression (deterrence) and 
compelling an adversary to undo an action that 
seeks change in the status quo (compellence). 
Further, Alagappa stated that nuclear weapon 
can be used as a tool for coercive diplomacy, 
counterforce role, preserving strategic 
autonomy, and, power and prestige reason. He 
added that states use nuclear weapon to 
compensate their conventional power ability to 
achieve deterrence capability.
7
 
Moreover, according to the hard 
realists, states will likely pursue nuclear 
weapons if they engaged in enduring rivalries 
and protracted conflicts in the regions. On the 
other hand, states in areas of low or moderate 
conflict will less likely develop nuclear 
weapon.
8
 In high-threat environment, states 
6
Muthiah Alagappa, “ Introduction: Inv estigating 
Nuclear Weapons in a New Era,” in Muthiah 
Alagappa (ed.),  2008,  The Long Shadow: Nuclear 
Weapons and Security in 21
st
 Century Asia, 
California: Stanford University Press, p 3  
7
Muthiah Alagappa, “ Exploring Roles, Strategies, 
and Implications,” in  pp 81-87  
8
TV Paul, 2000, Power vs Prudence: Why Nations 
Forgo Nuclear Weapons , Quebec: McGill-
Queen‘s University Press, p 5  
will pursue a ‘security first’ approach because 
they are highly focused about relative gains 
and less worried about the negative security 
externalities that they may impose on their 
enemies. On the contrary, states in the low and 
moderate conflicts zones are most likely to 
forgo nuclear weapon.
9
 
As noted by Scott Sagan (1996), 
nuclear weapon is more than instrument of 
national security. Sagan used the three models 
to explain states‘ choice to go nuclear. Sagan 
believes that nuclear weapon is more than tools 
of national security. This weapon is a political 
object of domestic political process. Further, 
he also noted that nuclear weapon also serves 
as international normative symbols of 
modernity and identity.
10
 Thus, analyzing 
nuclear weapon proliferation phenomenon 
through national security point of view is not 
enough.
 
The first is the security model explains 
that states pursue nuclear weapon because they 
need to match power for power. Nuclear 
weapon is able to produce a massive 
destruction. As a result, it has a crucial element 
9
 Ibid pp 20-22 
10
Scott D. Sagan, Winter 1996/7, “Why Do States 
Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search 
of a Bomb,” International security, Vol.21, No.3 , 
p. 55 
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to ensure national security. Moreover, any 
state that looked to guard their national 
security must balance against any rival state 
that has nuclear weapons by develops a nuclear 
deterrent itself.
11
 
The second is the domestic politics 
model says that nuclear proliferation appears 
as a product of bureaucratic process or political 
interests within the state. In this model, 
external threats are not the main cause to seek 
nuclear capabilities. The development of 
nuclear weapon is pushed by the elements 
within a state. Therefore, the domestic actors 
hold a crucial factor in the decision making 
process to pursue nuclear weapons. According 
11
 Ibid p.57 
to Sagan, these domestic actors are the state‘s 
nuclear energy establishment (nuclear 
scientists and other elements in the state-run 
nuclear facilities), a certain component in the 
129
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navy occasionally interested in nuclear weapon 
procurement as well), and the last actor is the 
politicians.
12
 
The third is the norms model sees 
nuclear decisions as pursuing crucial symbolic 
functions. The procurement of nuclear weapon 
is seen as a tool to boost prestige. This prestige 
is used to enhance the state‘s international 
influence and security.
13
 In addition, Barry 
O‘Neill (1999) argued that nuclear weapon is 
best fit as symbolic means, since it is so 
12
 Ibid p.63 
13
Ibid p.76
difficult to be used as a military instrument 
239
                                                          
  
14
Barry  O‘Neill,  1999,  Honor,  Symbols,  and  War, 
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Pers, p. 
compares to the conventional one.
14
                                                          
 2.2.Evaluating Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
 
After discussing the reasons that 
stimulate states to pursue nuclear weapon, this 
section will elaborate why nuclear 
nonproliferation regime sometimes fails to 
prevent nuclear weapon escalations. Since the 
use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, people have been trying to prevent 
the spread of this absolute weapon. To some 
extent, they succeed in controlling the spread 
of nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, their efforts 
cannot force or attract some states to give up 
their nuclear choice. 
The catastrophic effect of nuclear 
weapon created an urgency to implement 
disarmament of this weapon.  It is assumed 
that a one-megaton airburst can immediately 
kill or wound about 50 percent of the people 
living within 7.5 km of ground zero. Thus, the 
radiation from nuclear weapon can produce 
casualties and downgrade the environment.
15
 
Since it has the power to eradicate civilization 
and endanger the human race, people think that 
they need to implement the goal of a nuclear 
weapon free world.
16
 Moreover, there is a 
possibility that nuclear weapon could fall into 
the hands of dangerous irrational actors. There 
is also fear from the great powers that the 
                                      
15
16
Michael Mccgwire, 2000, “the Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons,” in John Baylis and Robert 
O‘Neill (eds.) Alternative Nuclear Futures, 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
p. 145 
 
                 
James J. Wirtz, “ Weapons of Mass Destruction” 
in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer 
(eds.), 2010, The Routledge Handbook of Security 
Studies (London and New York: Routledge, pp. 
144-145 
 
military (usually within the air force, but the 
                                        
widely spread nuclear weapons will decrease 
deterrence effectiveness.
17
 Wars could break 
out as a result of a failure deterrence strategy. 
 
In order to reduce the risks of nuclear 
war, nuclear nonproliferation regime emerged 
as a solution.
18
 Although there is no guarantee 
if arms race will breed a war, disarmament and 
arms control has become a primary tool to 
prevent a war.
19
 If states join the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, their decisions would 
provide assurance of similar behavior by other 
states. Further, once states enter it, the exit 
costs become high. The decision to leave the 
regime would create stronger international 
reaction than if it had not joined in the first 
place.
20
 
                                                          
18 Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in Scott 
D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds), 2003 The 
Spread Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed , 
New York and London: W.
                  
17
George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. 
Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, 2008, “Toward A 
Nuclear Free World,” Wall Street Journal , 
January 15, p. A13 
W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 
 
pp 78-79
 
19
Coit D. Blacker and Glordia Duffy (ed.), 1984, 
International Arms Control: Issues and 
Agreements, California: Stanford University 
Press, p. 11 
 
20
 Paul, Power vs Prudence, p.28 
To some extent, the decision to join 
nuclear nonproliferation regime create some 
130
incentives. It secures certain international 
economic, financial, and political benefits that 
could be used to maintain domestic political 
support.
21
 
However, these incentives are not 
enough to attract some new nuclear states to 
join the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Why 
this is happening? To answer this question, I 
will use Sagan‘s models of why states pursue 
nuclear weapon capabilities. In addition, this 
model and the hypothesis of this paper will be 
asses with North Korea case study. Colin Gray 
(1992) explained that the arms control regime 
tends to focus on objectives or contingent 
promises, rather than upon the strategic issues 
21
 Etel Solingen, Fall 1994, “The Political Economy 
of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security, Vol. 
19, No.2,  p. 139 
of means and ends. Arms control also cannot 
resolve a conflict, because arms are not the 
heart of the problem.
22
 In the case of North 
Korea‘s nuclear weapons procurement, its 
motivations to develop nuclear weapons are 
not merely about Pyongyang‘s strategic 
purpose, but there are also domestic politics 
and symbolic means.   
In order to enhance Gray‘s 
explanation, I would like to add my arguments 
to solve the puzzle. First, nuclear 
nonproliferation regime does not resolve 
security problems of some new nuclear states. 
Moreover, if these new nuclear states are 
located in the high conflict region, 
denuclearization will be unlikely happen. 
Nevertheless, non-nuclear policy and full 
allegiance to the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime would occur only if conflict in their 
regions is defused.
23
 Further, Neil Cooper 
(2006) noted that disarmament and arms 
control are designed to support the military 
hegemony of the United States and the West.
24
  
                                                          
22
Colin S. Gray, 1992, House of Cards: Why Arms 
Control Must Fail, NewYork: Cornell University 
Press, p. 220 
23
Op cit, p. 29 
24
Neil Cooper, “ Putting Disarmament Back in the 
Frame,” Review of International Studies, 32, p. 
354 
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To a certain degree, the nuclear 
umbrella also plays an important part in this 
context. The US nuclear umbrella will threaten 
non-US ally states. Since the United States 
provides the protection, there is no necessity to 
develop nuclear capabilities for US ally states. 
Thus, it is a nonnuclear proliferation tool.
25
 US 
nuclear umbrella does not work for these 
countries, and they are unlikely to forgo their 
nuclear weapons.
 
Second, nuclear states would be 
unwilling to join nuclear nonproliferation 
regime if nuclear weapon is used as a symbolic 
status to support the establishment of local 
government. In the Sagan‘s domestic model, as 
one of the actors that influenced nuclear 
weapons procurement decision, the politicians 
need the symbolic means of nuclear weapons 
to attract the support from the people. The 
leaders of these nuclear states, especially in 
authoritarian countries, will avoid the risk of 
being overthrown because they lose the 
support from their people.  
 
 
25
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, 2011, 
“Extended Deterrence and Disarmament: Japan                                                                                     
and the New US Nuclear Posture,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol 18, no.1,  p. 128 
3. Case Study – North Korea: Untamed 
“Hermit” Kingdom? 
North Korea is often called as a 
Hermit Kingdom. This term appears because 
Pyongyang limited its interaction with the 
outside world. North Korea is one of the 
nuclear states members. In the last decade, it 
has done several missile tests. The last missile 
131
failed to launch.
26
 
North Korea joined the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation treaty (NPT) on December 
1985. However, it announced the intention to 
withdraw from the treaty on 1993. On October 
1994, the United States and Democratic 
People‘s Republic of Korea signed the Agreed 
Framework between the two countries. The 
framework called to freeze North Korea‘s 
nuclear weapon proliferation. Nevertheless, 
North Korea unfreezes its nuclear program on 
December 2002. Finally, the DPRK announced 
its withdrawal from the nuclear nonproliferation 
 on January 2003. This 
several ballistic  missiles 
action   is  followed  by 
remarkable tests was 
tests ; one of the 
 Further, several efforts 
Taepodong missile test. 
down  North   Korea‘s 
were made done to shut  
 including six  party  talks
 nuclear  proliferation, 
 
27
. 
efforts seem not to have 
Nonetheless, the 
to resolve the crisis. 
achieved the objective  
 
 
3.1. North Korea‟s Nuclear Choice 
The foundations of Pyongyang‘s 
nuclear policy are songun (military-first) 
politics and juche (self reliance) ideology. 
Since the development of nuclear weapons 
need massive resources, songun politics 
enables the DPRK to ensure that the 
proliferation is supported by sufficient 
27
 Yoichi Funabashi, 2007, The Peninsula Question: 
A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, 
Washington: The Brooking Institution, p.477-482 
26
Alyssa   New    Combb,  Luis   Martinez,    Martha 
Raddatz,   2012,  “North  Korean  Rocket   Launch 
Fails:  US  Officials,” ABC NEWS. Accessed May, 
19
th
 2012, 04 : 02  PM. 
International/north
http : //abc news. go. com /
-korea-
?id=16125951  
launches-test-rocket/story
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test was on 12
th
 April 2012, but this test was 
material. Thus, the justification to concentrate 
the resources in the military side is 
strengthened by the application of Juche 
ideology.
28
 These two ideologies were born as 
a result of the international politics dynamics 
around North Korea and ensure North Korea 
regime‘s survival. Moreover, North Korea 
security environment also played an important 
part to drive Pyongyang‘s nuclear option.
29
 
3.1.1. Juche Ideology 
The word juche was used for the first 
time on December 28, 1955. It was in the 
speech from Kim Il Sung entitled “ On the 
Need to Repel Dogmatism and Formalism and 
to Establish Juche in Carrying Out Ideological 
Programs”. In that period, North Korea was 
starting to recover from the defeat and 
devastation of the Korean War. Thus, it faced 
declining levels of assistance from its 
Communist allies. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of Juche ideology actually 
began after December 6, 1967, when Kim Il 
Sung gave a speech to the first session of the 
Fourth Supreme People‘s Assembly.
30
 
Although North Korea claims that the 
origins of the Juche ideology could be traced 
back to June 1930, many Western analysts of 
29
 Ibid 
30
Ilpyong J. Kim, “ Kim Jong Il‘s Military-First 
Politics,” in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack 
Kim (eds.), 2006, North Korea: The Politics of 
Regime Survival, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc,  p. 
62 
28
 John S. Park  and Dong Sun Lee, “North Korea: 
Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage,” 
in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), 2008, The Long 
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21
st
 
Century Asia, California: Stanford University 
Press, p.275 
North Korean politics believed that the 
ideology was born as a response to cope with 
the Sino-Soviet conflict.
31
 Further, Kim Il 
Sung made Juche an instrument for developing 
a personality cult of himself, and a means 
31
 Ibid 
132
defining DPRK  ‘ and independence’
‘separateness’ from both the Soviet Union and 
China.
32
 Actually North Korea adopted 
32
Young Whan Kihl, “ Staying Power of the 
Socialist “Hermit Kingdom” in Young Whan Kihl 
and Hong Nack Kim (eds.) North Korea: The 
Marxism-Leninism as its ruling philosophy 
when it proclaimed the country, an 
establishment on September 7, 1948. 
Consequently, the Juche ideology has 
developed into a state ideology that the North 
Koreans represent as a higher form of 
Marxism-Leninism. Juche was a creative 
application of Marxism-Leninism to fit into the 
local condition in DPRK.
33
 
Juche starts from the proposition that 
humans are masters of all things and are 
uniquely endowed among all the creatures of 
nature. Thus, humans (according to juche 
ideology) have three special attributes: 
chajusong (the spirit of independence and self 
reliance), creativity and consciousness of their 
own identity and potential. The doctrine also 
emphasized the importance of the popular 
masses. However, the masses cannot succeed 
in their struggle without a uniquely qualified 
leader to interpret, give form to their 
Politics of Regime Survival (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe Inc; 2006) p. 7
 
33
Donald N. Clark (ed.), 1996,  The Koreans: 
Contemporary Politics and Society, third edition, 
Colorado: Westview Press, p. 166 
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aspirations and direct their efforts. Kim Il-sung 
(followed by his son Kim Jong Il, and now his 
grandchildren, Kim Jong Un) was such a 
leader.
34
 Kim Il Sung declared Juche as 
independence in politics, self sustenance in the 
34
 Ibid p. 170  
35
Charles K. Amstrong, “ ‘A Socialism of Our 
Style‘: North Korean ideology in a Post-
Communist Era,” in Samuel S. Kim  (ed.), 1998, 
economy and self defence in national 
security.
35
 
North Korean Foreign Relations In The Post-
                                                          
 
the allocation of resources towards the 
advancement of the nuclear weapon program.
39
 
 3.1.2. Songun Policy 
The leadership of the Kim‘s family in 
North Korea adopted a totalitarianism regime 
style. It consists of six characteristics of 
totalitarianism as identified by Carl Friedrich 
and Zbigniew Brzezinski. North Korea has an 
absolute dictator and mass party; an elaborate 
As North Korea‘s national strategy, at 
the very least, Juche refers to state survival and 
protection of national sovereignty.
36
 
Otherwise, 
Juche doctrine  aims  to  be the  force  to  lead 
 North Korea towards the strongest  position 
in the world.
 37
 Besides that North Korea Realized   
the  importance   of  ideology   as  a  means  of 
 political control in the DPRK. 
38
  The Juche ideology becomes a drive to 
make North Korea a global major power, while 
at the same time, it ensures the survival of the 
Kim‘s authoritarian regime in North Korea.  
As a result, nuclear weapons, as the absolute 
weapon, become a prominent tool to achieve 
the objective to become a global major power. 
Thus, nuclear weapons, at least, would be able 
to guarantee the survival of North Korea. The 
Juche ideology also provides justification for 
36
 Victor D. Cha,  2002 “North Korea‘s Weapon of 
Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?”
Political Science Quarterly, Volume 117 , No. 2, 
p. 214 
37
 Samuel S. Kim, “In Search of a Theory of North 
Korean Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), 
1998, North Korean Foreign Relations In The 
Post-Cold War Era , Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, p.3 
38
Amstrong, “ ‘A Socialism of Our Style‘: North 
Korean Ideology in a Post-Communist Era,” p.34  
 
                  
                  
ideology; its people live in a condition of terror 
of a repressive coercive apparatus with a 
 
39
Park and Lee, “ North Korea: Existential 
Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage,” p. 275 
Cold War Era , Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, p.36 
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centralized economy; and there is total control 
of the media of mass communication by the 
local government.
40
In order to gain elite loyalty, especially 
the Korean People‘s Army (KPA), all the top 
officers in KPA gained luxury gifts from the 
government. Further, Kim Jong Il declared 
Songun-chongci (military-first policy) on 
October 20, 1998. It is believed in that period 
that Kim Jong Il have lost confidence in the 
old cadres who were associated with his father. 
A number of defectors appeared at that time, 
especially professor of Juche ideology at Kim 
Il Sung University, Hwang Jang Yop.
41
  
Consequently, Kim Jon Il tried to 
develop a critical base to support him. The 
“military-first” policy indicated that the 
important entity (the authoritarian government 
main supporter) is no longer the Korean 
Worker‘s Party, but the Korean People‘s 
40
Andrew Scobell, March 2006, “Kim Jong Il and 
North Korea: The Leader and The System,” The 
Strategic Studies Institute, p.3 
41
Ilpyong J. Kim, “ Kim Jong Il‘s Military-First 
 
Politics,” p. 65
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Army. Although the apparatus from the party 
appears to be loyal to the local regime, its 
allegiance to Kim Jong Il probably is not as 
strong as it was to his father. Meanwhile, 
soldiers, in particular, appear to be extremely 
local by most accounts, even though there have 
been some defections within the armed 
forces.
42
 Kim Jong il was also determined that 
                                                                                   
political power should be derived from the 
support of the North Korean military forces.
43
 
42
 Op cit p.25  
43
 Op cit.p.66  
Through the Songun policy, North 
Korea emphasized development in the military 
sector. The implementation of this policy is 
supported by the Juche ideology. Despite great 
economic problems, Kim‘s regime has been 
able to configure and implement its nuclear 
policy. The leadership of the Kim‘s regime in 
North Korea would be dependent on the 
management and maintenance of the system, 
thereby boosting prospects for the survival of 
Kim‘s family in the North Korea‘s throne.
44
 As 
noted by one of North Korean defectors, Yim 
Yong Son, the officers and soldiers of the KPA 
are proud of the development of nuclear and 
chemical weapons.
45
 In this case, nuclear 
weapon plays an important part in ensuring 
loyalty from the armed forces. 
                                                          
44
Park and Lee, “ North Korea: Existential 
Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage,” p. 275 
45
 Michael J. Mazarr, 1995, North Korea and The 
Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation, New 
York: St. Martin Press, p. 101 
 3.1.3. North Korea’s Security Environment 
There are at least three security aspects 
in the consideration for North Korea to pursue 
nuclear weapon. The first aspect is the huge 
development gap between DPRK and the 
Republic of Korea; the second, the fall of 
Soviet Union; and the third aspect, the United 
States hostile policy toward Pyongyang. 
Gap between DPRK and ROK. North 
Korea began to develop nuclear weapon in 
1980s. It is believed that one of the reasons of 
nuclear weapon proliferation was the reaction 
to South Korea‘s development. Seoul was able 
to overtake and surpass Pyongyang‘s 
development in the late 1970s.
46
  The two 
Koreas have been involved in intense 
international competition for legitimacy, 
prestige and support. The confrontation in the 
Korean Peninsula has been happening since 
1948.
47
  Since 1948, DPRK had set the goal for 
                  
46
David Kang, “ North Korea‘s Military and 
Security Policy,” in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), 1998, 
North Korean Foreign Relations In The Post-
Cold War Era , Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press,  p. 180 
47
Clark, The Koreans: Contemporary and Politics 
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 “victorious unification” (songong t’ongil ) over 
South Korea. However, with the widening gap 
between the two of them, the idea to overthrow 
the South and unify the peninsula by DPRK 
seems difficult to obtain.
48
  
The fall of Soviet Union. The fall of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War 
created a massive impact on North Korea‘s 
security environment. These circumstances 
undermined North Korea is position in the 
international politics. Moreover, the Soviet 
Union‘s succesor, Russia  chose  to  normalized  
relations  with  Seoul on September 1990. The
                                                          
and Society, 3
rd
 Edition pp 234-235 
48
Cha, “ North Korea‘s Weapon of Mass 
Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?” p. 215 
worst condition for DPRK was 
Evaluating Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime - Case Study : North Korea      Adhi Priamarizki,
 declared not to honor Soviet Cold 
when Russia 
 agreements to DPRK defence.
War security 
49
 The United States‟ hostile policy 
towards Pyongyang.  The threat to use nuclear 
weapons during the Korean War and the 
deployment of nuclear weapon system in 
South Korea by the U.S. produced North 
50
Park and Lee, “ North Korea: Existential 
Deterrence and Diplomatic L everage,” p. 270 
51
 Op Cit p. 209 
52
East Asian Strategic Review 2010,  The  National 
Institute for Defense Studies Japan, May 2010, p.72 
Ibid p. 218
49
  
                                                           
Korea‘s sense of vulnerability to the U.S. 
attacks.
50
 Further, the axis of evil branding to 
DPRK by George W. Bush added Pyongyang‘s 
insecurity.
51
 As noted by North Korean 
Foreign Ministry on January 13, 2010 that 
North Korea will probably no longer require 
nuclear weapons, if the US nuclear threat is 
abolished and removed its nuclear umbrella 
from South Korea.
52
 Even though this factor 
cannot be counted as the main trigger of 
Pyongyang‘s nuclear decision, Washington‘s 
  
hostility takes a part in DPRK‘s nuclear 
, p.640
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
As opposed to the liberalist‘s view that 
state will join the international regime to 
enhance perpetual peace; this paper finds that 
nuclear states would not join the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime if there are no 
guarantees for their security. Furthermore, the 
local regime or government‘s survivability 
must be counted as a consideration. Nuclear 
weapon, as the absolute weapon, provides a 
deterrence strategy to deter an attack from the 
adversaries. The North Korea case study has 
shown that nuclear weapon gives guarantee for 
the local regime or government longevity.  
Even though nuclear weapon acquisition in 
North Korea created a negative impact for its 
and Disarmament,” Strategic Analysis, Vol 32, 
no.4  
economy, DPRK has a bargaining power 
because of nuclear weapon. 
Nuclear nonproliferation regime must 
evaluate their “ stick and carrot” strategy. 
Using financial gains as an incentive to attract 
states to forgo their nuclear proliferation is not 
the best way, because it does not resolve the 
security problem. Further, nuclear non proliferation
regime should consider the  local  regime  or 
 government survivability factor in the negotiation 
table.
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